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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal pursuant to UCA §78-2a-
3(2)(j). The case was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court under Rule 42, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Plaintiff agrees with issues one, two and five, set forth by defendants in their 
brief, but suggests that defendants have improperly characterized issues three and four. Issue 
number three, as styled by defendants, questions whether a damage award for conversion is 
sustainable without evidence of market value. The inquiry is somewhat misleading. Any 
damage award must be supported by competent evidence. Some types of property do not have 
market value, simply because there is no market. The value of property can be demonstrated 
by means other than market value evidence. The issue should read as follows: 
Did plaintiff present sufficient evidence to support the damage award for 
conversion? 
Defendants' characterization of issue number four also misses the point. Plaintiff 
acknowledges that as a general proposition a demand for return of property is a necessary 
condition precedent to sustain a cause of action for conversion. However, demand is excused 
when the conversion is tortious. A better statement of the issue would be the following: 
Did plaintiff demand a return of the property before filing suit, and if 
not, was she excused from doing so? 
STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
Each issue presents an evidence sufficiency inquiry which should be reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Atla Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993). 
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Whether plaintiff was excused from making further demand upon defendants for a return of 
the property is an ultimate conclusion of law which should be reviewed for correctness. State 
vJPena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). The facts surrounding the claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress would be reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard, but aside from 
causation, there is little dispute between the parties concerning those facts. The ultimate 
conclusion in connection with that tort theory is whether the conduct of defendants was 
outrageous and that issue must be reviewed for correctness. 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY. REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The issues in this case are very ordinary and depend upon case law for 
resolution. There are no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions which have 
application. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking to recover damages for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, conversion of personal property, and for money had and 
received. There was no jury demand. The trial court denied relief on the third claim, but 
awarded damages to plaintiff for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion. 
Defendants appealed the judgment of the trial court. No cross-appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants' brief recites the facts in great detail, and plaintiff agrees generally 
with their version of the events. However, defendants have interwoven much by way of 
opinion and argument into the factual statement, and portray the background information in 
a light which is supportive of their position. Some clarification is necessary. 
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The relationship between plaintiff and her late husband (this brief will refer to 
the decedent as "Little Ed" as have defendants in their brief), was tender and affectionate at 
times, but highly volatile on other occasions. The union witnessed physical violence. "He 
[Little Ed] did beat me a lot, he did hit me." T.52. Little Ed openly acknowledged his 
infidelity. "[Little Ed] told me that he was cheating on me, that he'd been sleeping with two -
- two girls." T.67-68. Little Ed drank habitually and excessively. The plaintiff did not drink. 
T.67. The problem with alcohol existed early in the marriage. While the parties were living 
in Aurora with plaintiffs mother, approximately one week after they were married, Little Ed 
became highly intoxicated and threatened to take his own life with a gun which he was 
brandishing in the presence of plaintiff. However, he was overcome by the alcohol and the 
gun was taken by plaintiff and delivered to Mr. Francis. T.54-56. 
The events of March 16, 1994, are significant. Plaintiff and Little Ed agreed to 
separate at that time. Plaintiff gives us the setting: 
And then I held that (his infidelity) against him until March 16th and I 
told him I was moving out. I says, you've been cheating on me, you hit 
me, everything, and that's when he ask me to leave the house . . . T.68. 
It was 9:00 in the morning. Plaintiff called for her mother to come and pick her 
up. Little Ed was indecent in speaking with the mother. T.69. Plaintiff was planning to take 
personal belongings with her, but Little Ed attempted to prevent her from doing so. He called 
his parents for assistance. Plaintiff had contacted her parents to bring a vehicle to haul 
personal property from the home. T.70. 
Plaintiffs parents and defendants responded to the calls and actively participated 
l 
in the violent dispute over the household items. Plaintiff removed some items from the home, 
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but Little Ed and the defendants cut her effort short. T.71-72, 284-285. 
But Big Ed and Little Ed would not let me move anything else out, so 
I went and called the cops again and Patricia interrupted me when I was 
on the phone . . . T.2. 
Finally, she grabbed the phone and grabbed me and ripped it out of the 
wall and threw me on the ground and then she sat on me. T.72. 
Plaintiffs mother attempted to remove the television set from the home, but, 
"Little Ed tried to kick it in and so my mom kicked in a gun case." T.73. 
Mr. Francis participated in the fracas. He, "grabbed my mom by the arm and 
drug her out of — out of the house and slammed her up against the house, grabbed her and 
she had a bruise all around here, from him taking her out of the house and said not to come 
back in." T.73. 
Several law enforcement officers responded to the call for assistance. The police 
dispatcher characterized the matter as a family fight. T.ll l . The officers interceded as peace 
keepers, but resisted involvement in the property dispute. T.113. One of the officers advised 
defendants to leave and let plaintiff and Little Ed adjust their own differences. Mrs. Francis 
responded by saying that they were not going to leave because they owned the house. T.114. 
While at the scene, the same officer overheard Mr. Francis tell plaintiff that she would not be 
allowed to take any of the personal property. 
He directed a remark to the young lady at one stating that you didn't 
come into the marriage with anything and your not leaving any - leaving 
it with anything except what you're wearing. T.114. 
The violent encounter between plaintiff and Mrs. Francis resulted in the need 
for medical attention. Plaintiff was concerned for her unborn baby. 
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I was feeling a lot of pains and so I called the doctor and I said I, you 
known, I'm having a lot of pains and I says, I've just had an argument, I 
says I really need to come up and see if anything's wrong with the baby, 
and I did. I went up to Dr. Nay. Dr. Nay's up in Gunnison and he sent 
me over to Sevier Valley -- or to Gunnison Valley Hospital and hooked 
me up to a baby monitor. T.78. 
The war of hate continued after the suicidal death of Little Ed. The trauma of 
the situation was more than plaintiff could bear and she required hospitalization from March 
18,1994 through March 23,1994. T.88. During the hospital stay, plaintiff received a call from 
defendant's counsel who inquired whether she would talk with Mr. Francis regarding funeral 
arrangements. She stated that she would, and within minutes Mr. Francis placed a call to her. 
T.89. Mr. Francis told her that the funeral arrangements had been made, that Little Ed's body 
would be cremated, and that he was not going to cancel those plans. T.90. He did not tell 
plaintiff when the funeral was to be held, and he said nothing about the place of the services. 
T.90. Mr. Francis concluded the call by telling plaintiff that she would not be allowed to 
attend the final services for the decedent. T.91, 285. 
After being released from the hospital, plaintiffs physical and emotional health 
continued to be precarious, and risk to her unborn child was present. T.91-92. She was living 
with her mother in Aurora during that time. T.91. 
It was during the telephone conversation between Mr. Francis and plaintiff when 
the latter was hospitalized that defendants made one of the heinous accusations that plaintiff 
had killed her husband. His words were, "and why did you kill my son?" T.90. Mrs. Francis 
uttered those same horrible words when plaintiff called her after discovering the body of Little 
Ed. Plaintiff reported the conversation as follows: 
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I told her, you guys need to get over here. Your son is dead. And she -
- she started screaming, saying, what have you done? Why did you kill 
my son? And if I get there when you're there, I'm going to kill you. T.87. 
Plaintiff learned about obituary notices approximately one week after the death 
of Little Ed. One notice appeared in the Salina Sun, and another was published in the Daily 
Herald. T.92. The Salina Sun obituary was not available during the trial proceedings, but 
plaintiff introduced into evidence the Daily Herald notice. T.93. It was marked and received 
as plaintiffs exhibit 18. T.94. The notice does not mention plaintiff nor her daughter, nor 
does it disclose that Little Ed was survived by a wife. 
Funeral services were handled by Springer Turner Funeral Homes. Joe Springer 
is the mortician and owner of the business. He met with the defendants to make the funeral 
arrangements. T.105. Mr. Francis told him that plaintiff and Little Ed were divorced. He 
told that lie the day of Little Ed's death. T.106. The funeral notice which Mr. Springer 
prepared was received into evidence at exhibit 19. T.106. Like the notice in the Daily Herald, 
it is silent concerning plaintiff and her child. Plaintiff complained to Mr. Springer about the 
situation, and he responded by an additional publication in the Salina Sun which corrected the 
prior omission. The notice was received as exhibit 17. T-94-95. The funeral services were 
held as scheduled on March 22, 1994, while plaintiff was hospitalized. She learned of the 
situation some days later. T.96. 
The status concerning ownership of the Sigurd home was never certain. 
Defendants took title to the home at the outset, but the interest of plaintiff and Little Ed was 
never defined. Plaintiff and Little Ed paid money to defendants and they in turn made the 
mortgage payments. T.62. However, defendants promised plaintiff and Little Ed that they 
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would own the home after the mortgage was satisfied. T.64. Plaintiff and Little Ed had 
contributed $1,450 to the downpayment for the home, but nothing memorialized any actual 
interest on their part in the property. Defendant had total control over the situation. T.59. 
Plaintiff eventually abandoned any claim for the $1,450 contribution to the home, a result 
confirmed by the trial court. R.116. 
After being released from the hospital, plaintiff made an additional effort to 
retrieve her personal property. She visited the Sigurd home, although she was afraid to do so. 
Someone had told her that she was not allowed at the home. T.97. Her visit to the home 
occurred on March 24, 1994, the day after she was released from the hospital. She looked 
through a kitchen window. Apparently the home was locked and secure. T.97-98. Plaintiff 
was never able to again acquire possession of any of the property. T.170. However, shortly 
before trial, plaintiff did learn about some of her personal belongings which defendants had 
placed in storage in Payson. T.171. Arrangements were made for an inspection of the 
property and photographs were taken. T. 172-176. 
While plaintiff was hospitalized, she received information that defendants had 
begun to move personal property out of the Sigurd home. That concern prompted her to call 
the defendants and inquire about the household contents. The call was placed and a daughter 
of defendants answered. Plaintiff asked about the property, but the daughter rebuffed her by 
telling plaintiff to never call defendants' home again. T.272-273, 283. 
Three or four months after the death of Little Ed, plaintiffs mother happened 
to pass defendant's home in Salina and noticed items they were offering in a garage sale which 
she recognized as belonging to plaintiff. She immediately enlisted the assistance of a friend 
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who attended the garage sale and purchased several of those items. They included a pan, 
some towels, and a toaster. They were easily recognized as Christmas gifts which plaintiff had 
received from her mother. T.371-372. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS WAS CLEARLY OUTRAGEOUS 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is complete where 
intentional outrageous conduct causes extreme distress. The leading case of Retherford v. 
AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) discusses the cause of action in the 
following language: 
Because of the nature of this cause of action, it can be difficult to 
determine when all its elements-intentional, outrageous conduct 
proximately causing extreme distress-have come into being. Of particular 
difficulty is the element of injury-extreme emotional distress. Sometimes, 
to be sure, single outrageous incident, such as an egregiously vicious 
practical joke, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §46 cmt. d, illus. 1 
(1965), results in immediate and easily identifiable emotional distress. 
Often, however, emotional distress does not so much occur as unfold-for 
example, where a defendant subjects a plaintiff, not to a single 
outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by 
themselves though clearly intolerable in the aggregate, p. 975 
The harm or injury (actual emotional distress) is subjective. It is particular to 
each plaintiff. The hardy may escape harm while the fragile suffer greatly. Inferences must 
favor the plaintiff. Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991). 
Defendants physically assaulted both plaintiff and her mother in an effort to 
retain possession of plaintiffs personal property when plaintiff and the decedent intended to 
separate on March 16, 1994. Plaintiff was hospitalized as a result, primarily to determine the 
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status of her unborn child. Mr. Francis told an intervening peace officer that he would not 
approve of her leaving the marriage with anything. Both defendants accused plaintiff of 
murdering her husband. The conduct of defendants made plaintiff fearful. During plaintiffs 
hospitalization following the death of her husband, Mr. Francis told her by telephone that she 
would not be allowed to participate in funeral services. Information concerning the services 
was concealed from her. The service program omitted any reference to plaintiff or her child. 
Obituary notices did the same. Information in those documents came from Mr. Francis. He 
intentionally caused those documents to be prepared in that manner. His deceit is reflected 
by the lie to the funeral director that plaintiff and her husband were divorced. 
After being released from the hospital, plaintiff was told by defendants' daughter 
that she should never call the home of defendants again. Plaintiff had called to inquire about 
her personal property. The home itself was locked and she was excluded from the premises. 
Defendants secreted some of plaintiffs belongings at a storage yard in Payson. Other items 
were sold by them at a yard sale conducted at their home in Salina. 
The trial court compared the conduct of defendants to that of thieves, and asked, 
"Why is it that a theft isn't outrageous?" Being accused of murder is outrageous. Intentional 
exclusion from the funeral of a loved one is outrageous. The lie told my Mr. Francis to the 
funeral director was outrageous. 
Plaintiff was a fragile victim. She was having trouble carrying her unborn child. 
Her mental health was not robust. He had been beaten and abused by her husband. 
Defendants were domineering and controlling. The trauma and physical violence on March 
16,1994, further weakened her resolve and will. The suicide of her husband placed her in the 
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hospital for a lengthy stay. In the face of all that, Mr. Francis accused her of murder and 
maliciously excluded her from final rites for her husband. When plaintiff later inquired about 
her personal property, she was coldly and rudely rebuffed. 
The law in general recognizes that one who intentionally injures or wrongfully 
converts personal property is liable for the mental distress which the owner suffers as a 
consequence. Brown v. Crocker (La App) 139 So 2d 779. The rule is succinctly stated in 28 
ALR 2d 1070, 1091, Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to 
Interference with Tangible Property: 
The rule that where there has been a wilful trespass committed under 
circumstances of malice or insult recovery may be had for mental 
disturbances proximately resulting from the defendant's wrongful act has 
been applied to justify the recovery of damages for mental disturbance, 
or physical injury caused thereby, occasioned by such a wrongful 
interference with a chattel. 
Damages for shock and mental anguish were approved for a young boy when his 
mare was intentionally shot causing the premature birth of a dead colt. Brown v. Crocker, 
supra. In Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb 449, 275 NW 674, a dairyman was allowed to 
recover where he suffered emotional distress because of the intentional poisoning of bran 
which caused the death of his dairy cattle. In Brown v. Zorn (Mo App) 275 SW 572, the 
plaintiff was allowed to recover for emotional distress after witnessing the defendant damage 
her automobile with a hatchet. In a case with similar facts to the instant matter, recovery for 
emotional distress was approved where the defendant wrongfully entered plaintiffs home while 
she was in the hospital and repossessed plaintiffs furniture. M.J. Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio 
App 448, 169 NE 716. The case of Harris v. Delaware. L. & W.R. Co. 77 NJL 278, 72 A 50, 
presents another situation with parallel facts. Plaintiff was awarded damages when the 
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defendant converted his personal property by a seizure and altercation with the plaintiff in the 
presence of other persons. The award included damages for the indignity and ignominy 
suffered by him. Recovery for emotional distress has been allowed repeatedly in wrongful 
repossession cases. Urban v. Hartford Gas Co. 139 Conn 301, 93 A2d 292, Gumpert v. Philip 
Werlein. Ltd. 149 La 840, 90 So 215, Sager v. Sisters of Mercy. 81 Colo 498, 256 P 8. The 
Restatement of Torts, §905, also recognizes the rule of law: 
A wantonly disposes B of household furniture to the knowledge of B's 
neighbors. B is entitled to damages for humiliation. (See other cases 
collected in 28 ALR 2d 1070). 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CAUSATION 
Defendants argue that causation is missing with reference to the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the memorandum decision of the trial court 
does not focus on causation. They contend that the suicide of plaintiffs husband is the 
necessary cause of her suffering, although they overlook the obvious which is that plaintiff 
suffered from the suicide as well as the outrageous conduct of the defendants. Plaintiff 
suffered both mentally and physically when she was assaulted on March 16, 1994. Her 
expressions of fear were real. She was upset and saddened when excluded from funeral 
services. She sought redress by asking for the publication of a corrected obituary notice. 
While languishing in the hospital with a near mental breakdown, she was accused by Mr. 
Francis of murdering her husband. It is simply incredulous that the element of causation could 
be seriously questioned. Expert testimony indicated that plaintiffs depression was brought on 
by both the suicide and the conduct of the defendants. Each of the hospital records reflects 
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the trauma which plaintiff experienced in consequence of the attitude and conduct of the 
defendants. Although the trial court did not make a specific finding on causation, the 
evidence is ample to reach that point. 
Emotional distress includes mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous 
shock, or highly unpleasant reactions such as fright, horror, grief or shame. The intensity and 
duration of the distress should be considered. Both physical manifestation of the distress and 
subjective testimony can be shown by way of proof. Furthermore, where the conduct of the 
defendant is outrageous, that conduct can be considered as evidence that severe distress 
existed. See Model Utah Jury Instruction 22.3. Samms v. Eccles. 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 
344 (1961); Evans v. Twin Falls County. 796 P.2d 87 (Idaho 199) Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §46 comment j (1964). 
The assault on plaintiff which occurred on March 16, 1994, coupled with the 
unsuccessful effort to obtain her personal belongings, placed her in the hospital. The death 
of her husband, and the accusation by Mrs. Francis that plaintiff had murdered him, 
necessitated additional hospital care. While pregnant, emotionally disturbed, and extremely 
fragile in both body and mind, Mr. Francis repeated the murder accusation and excluded 
plaintiff from final rites for her husband. Plaintiff testified that she was afraid of the 
defendants. Her grief was evident. She exhibited shame when excluded from the funeral and 
obituary notices, to the point that she demanded a corrected notice from the funeral director. 
Plaintiffs anguish and suffering is further demonstrated by her continuous concern for her 
unborn child. The suicide of her husband certainly increased the burdens then heaped upon 
her, it does not absolve defendants of their offensive and defaming statements, nor their hate 
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and deceit and their conduct in forcefully taking plaintiffs property. Causation was clearly 
established. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANTS MISCONSTRUE THE ELEMENT OF INTENT 
Defendants seek to escape liability from the emotional distress claim by arguing 
that they did not intend to cause plaintiff harm. However, their rationale is inappropriate. 
The element of intent goes to conduct, and not to the particular result. The conduct is judged 
by an objective standard (generally accepted standards of decency and morality), Retherford, 
supra, at 977. In this case, however, it is clear that the defendants did intend harm. They 
knowingly and forcefully took plaintiffs property, defamed her, and lied to prevent her from 
attending her husband's funeral. It would be ludicrous to believe that they did not intend to 
harm plaintiff. 
POINT IV. 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR CONVERSION 
Defendants attack the damage award for conversion of plaintiffs personal 
property on the ground that market value evidence was not presented. However, defendants 
ignore the general rule of law that the market value rule is not exclusive. The owner of 
property may recover based upon the actual value of the property to him. 34 ALR 3d 816, 
820, Valuation of Wearing Apparel or Household Goods Kept by Owner for Personal Use, 
in Action for Loss or Conversion of, or Injury to. Such Property, states the following: 
The courts faced with the problem have almost universally agreed that 
the owner of such property suing in tort for its loss, injury, or 
conversation is not limited to the value of similar goods on the 
secondhand market, but may recover their actual value to him. This rule 
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has been justified on the ground that the market for secondhand goods 
of this type does not actually reflect the economic value of the goods to 
the owner, since most people in this position will not in fact go into the 
secondhand market for replacement, but will be "forced" to purchase new 
goods. 
The courts in these cases have emphasized that it is the actual, economic 
value to the owner which is to be substituted for the normal market value 
test, and that no allowance is to be made for merely sentimental or 
fanciful value. 
In determining the actual value to the owner, the courts have been liberal 
in admitting evidence of any circumstance which could be reasonably 
relevant to the question. 
Utah has recognized that the "economic value to the owner" rule can be 
substituted for the normal market value test when faced with circumstances which equate with 
the facts in this case. Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 88 P 683 (Utah 1907); Pennington 
v. Redman Van & Storage Co., 97 P 115 (Utah 1908); Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110 (Utah 
1933). 
The rule of law is the same with reference to items of personal property which 
do not have any market value. Items such as personal papers, photographs, paintings, and the 
like, may not have any value except for the piece of paper itself. However, those items may 
have significant value to the owner. In cases of that nature, the courts have abandoned the 
market value measure of damages in favor of awarding damages based upon the "actual" value 
of the item or on its "value to the owner." The issue is discussed in 9 ALR 4th 1246, Elements 
and Measure of Damages Recoverable from Bailee for Loss, Destruction, or Conversion of 
Personal Papers, Photographs, or Paintings. The age and condition of the goods present 
relevant facts, but, "proof as to the original cost is most important." 34 ALR 3d 821. 
Furthermore, "the owner should always be permitted to give his own testimony as to the value 
14 
of the property to him . . . If 34 ALR 3d 822. 
The trial court addressed 68 items of personal property. No award was made 
for seven of those items (fencing supplies, wooden box and receipts, Utah Independent Bank 
account, gun rack, stereo, curtains, curtain rods). With reference to six items, the court 
adopted the values of defendants (tools, metal safe, money in wallet, camera, food storage, 
nintendo and games). The trial court awarded plaintiff $120 for a blue rocking chair, although 
the evidence indicated that two chairs were involved. Defendants gave one of the chairs to 
a workman in exchange for cleaning services, and perhaps the court viewed the cleaning bill 
as the responsibility of plaintiff. 
Ten guns were involved. Plaintiff expressed the opinion that the guns had a 
value of $400 each. Defendants contested that evidence. The court awarded $2,000 for the 
guns which would give them an average value of $200 each. The evidence indicated a value 
of $400 for at least two of the guns (a hand gun purchased by Mr. Francis from Little Ed, and 
a rifle sold to Juan Larsen). 
Plaintiff presented evidence concerning the actual cost of 24 items of the 
property, and the court awarded damages to her based upon that evidence. Plaintiff offered 
opinion testimony concerning the value of 29 items, and the court found that evidence 
persuasive and awarded damages accordingly. The following table summarizes the award of 
damages based upon cost evidence and opinion evidence and the relevant transcript page: 
Transcript 
Page Item Type of Evidence 
187 Lawn mower cost 
187 tiller cost 
187 CB radio opinion 
190 barbecue opinion 
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210 wall pictures opinion 
211 shop vacuum opinion 
211 vacuums opinion 
180 decedent's wedding ring cost 
180 plaintiffs wedding ring cost 
The trial court was justified in the various damage awards for the personal 
property although the evidentiary bases departed from a market value approach. Damages 
must be proven with reasonable certainty, but absolute precision is not necessary. Sawyers v. 
FMA Leasing, 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). An award of damages may be based upon an 
approximation if the fact of damage is established. Approximations may be based upon 
reasonable assumptions and projections. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel and 
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). A certain degree of uncertainty is tolerable in considering 
evidence for a damage award. Acculong, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). Where 
a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, he should not be allowed to escape liability 
because the amount of the loss cannot be proven with precision. Cook Associates, Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983). Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983). 
POINT V. 
DEMAND WAS MADE, BUT IF NOT IT WAS EXCUSED 
Defendants argue that conversion will not lie in this case because plaintiff did 
not demand a return of her property before suit was filed. Their argument fails for two 
reasons. The effort by plaintiff to remove her property the morning of March 16, 1994, was 
more than a demand. Defendants physically prevented her from doing so, and Mr. Francis 
told her she would have to leave the marriage with nothing. After her release from the 
hospital, she placed a telephone call to the home of the defendants and inquired about her 
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property. Defendants' daughter answered the call but refused to discuss the property issue. 
Plaintiff was told to never call defendants again. That call was tantamount to a demand and 
refusal. Secondly, defendants overlook the rule of law that demand and refusal are 
unnecessary when the taking is tortious. 
Generally, demand and refusal are unnecessary where the act of the 
defendant amounts to a conversion regardless of whether a demand is 
made. Thus, no demand is necessary where the conversion results from 
the defendant's securing possession of the property illegally or tortiously, 
by fraud or other wrongful conduct, and his denying possession thereof; 
from his wrongful appropriation of the property to his own use and 
benefit, after purchase thereof from one who had no right to sell it; from 
his misuse or abuse of the property; from his destruction of the property; 
or from his exercise of ownership by disposing of the property by lease, 
pledge, or sale. 18 Am Jur 2d, Conversion, §84, 205. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendants converted personal property owned by plaintiff, and did so knowingly 
and intentionally. They accused her of murder and excluded her from participating in funeral 
services for her late husband. They secreted part of the property in storage, and sold other 
items in a garage sale. Their conduct was outrageous, and plaintiff, who was in fragile health, 
suffered severely. The value of the property was demonstrated by competent cost and opinion 
evidence. Plaintiff demanded a return of the property on two occasions, but even if she had 
not done so, demand was not necessary because the taking was tortious. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed with costs on appeal to 
plaintiff. The evidence was sufficient to support the damage awards for tortious conversion 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
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